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Abstract—It is notoriously hard to develop dependable dis-
tributed systems. This is partly due to the difficulties in foreseeing
various corner cases and failure scenarios while implementing a
system that will be deployed over an asynchronous network. In
contrast, reasoning about the desired distributed system behavior
and the corresponding invariants is easier than reasoning about
the code itself. Further, the invariants can be used for testing,
theorem proving, and runtime enforcement.
In this paper, we propose an approach to observe the sys-
tem behavior and automatically infer invariants which reveal
implementation bugs. Using our tool, Avenger, we automatically
generate a large number of potentially relevant properties, check
them within the time and spatial domains using traces of system
executions, and filter out all but a few properties before reporting
them to the developer. Our key insight in filtering is that a good
candidate for an invariant is the one that holds in all but a
few cases, i.e., an “almost-invariant”. Our experimental results
with the XORP BGP implementation demonstrate Avenger’s
ability to identify the almost-invariants that lead the developer
to programming errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Implementing and deploying highly dependable distributed
systems is difficult for a number of reasons, including the sheer
system size, concurrency issues, the number of unforeseen
events, and the difficulty in structuring protocols that run over
asynchronous networks.
The approaches for making distributed systems more re-
liable have evolved from debugging using log inspection to
more complex techniques such as property checking [16], [18],
[22], model checking [14], [22], and enforcing the invariants
at runtime [22]. The latter approaches require the developer to
specify the desired system behavior in the form of invariants
that are supposed to hold at all times. Although reasoning
about invariants is arguably easier than reasoning about the
source code itself, the developer is still expected to provide the
invariants. This task becomes more and more difficult as the
system gets larger and more complicated, and as the developer
starts dealing with various corner cases. For example, in
distributed systems in which various network failures can
occur, reasoning about an invariant that holds under all failure
conditions can be difficult. While some distributed systems
have been written with invariants in mind [15], many have
not. Although others have shown that it is possible to discover
invariants [7], [8] and even specifications [2], [5] of single-
machine code, invariant inference is still an open and important
challenge in distributed system implementations.
We observe that, due to the difficulty of dealing with various
issues in the deployment environment, there exist a potentially
large number of important distributed system invariants that
only get violated under certain conditions (and would be
discarded if the existing tools for single-machine code [7], [8]
were to be applied). We refer to such properties as “almost-
invariants”1 . Most often, an almost-invariant gets violated
due to a rare manifestation of a bug that needs to be fixed.
In this paper, we introduce a new tool, Avenger, for infer-
ring almost-invariants in distributed system implementations.
Our approach leverages the rarity of the manifestation of
inconsistencies and emergent behaviors in complex distributed
systems and looks for the almost-invariants across long and
varied distributed system executions. Our tool, Avenger, uses
a grammar and developer input to generate a large number of
potential properties. The properties are evaluated for validity
both over time and spatially, e.g., across the system state.
Our key insight is in realizing that the complexity of
distributed environment (with its failure modes and the un-
derlying asynchronous network) makes it hard to reach bullet-
proof distributed system implementations. The last 1% bugs
manifest very rarely which makes them even harder to detect.
For example, a bug can be introduced when the developer
fails to take a particular sequence of inputs, events, or failures
(corner case) into consideration when writing the program, and
as a consequence the system does not behave as the developer
intended. It is also possible that some emergent behavior could
be the cause for less than perfect system operation. Using
these insights, Avenger ultimately reports a handful number of
almost-invariants that hold in most of (but not all) the cases.
We make the following contributions:
• We introduce a new automatic testing technique for
distributed system implementations based on identifying
the almost-invariants in execution traces. The inferred
almost-invariants are those that are likely to point to
programming errors.
• We demonstrate that our tool handles the peculiarities
of distributed invariants that span state across multiple
nodes, as well as invariants in the spatial domain (where
only some machines in the system are violating a property
at a given point in time).
• We demonstrate that our tool exposed a problem in
handling 4-byte AS numbers in the BGP protocol imple-
mented in C++ within the XORP open-source router [11].
1A property expresses a relation between some variables (including iterator
variables) which can be evaluated as true or false. Throughout this paper, we
use the term invariant to refer to a property that is never violated.
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Fig. 1: High-level overview of Avenger
II. AVENGER
Avenger is a centralized, off-line tool that the program-
mer runs either prior to, or after deployment. At a high-
level, Avenger works by examining consistent snapshots of
state across multiple nodes. The programmer prepares her
distributed system for analysis by Avenger in three steps: i)
providing the annotations, ii) compiling the executable, and
iii) generating the state traces. First, the programmer supplies
a C++ header file describing a node object, which contains
the state variables of interest. To drive the generation of
potential properties, the programmer also supplies two C++
files that contain predicates and iterators that are not already
supplied by Avenger. The final piece of developer input is
the values of configuration parameters that control the type
and the number of potential properties that will be generated.
Second, to produce the Avenger executable, the programmer
compiles and links: 1) the programmer-supplied files, 2) any
application libraries that are needed to access state or invoke
functions, and 3) the Avenger library. Finally, the programmer
supplies state traces to drive the Avenger executable. Entries
in the trace are system snapshots recorded over time: each
snapshot is a consistent set of nodes’ states.
Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of Avenger by
depicting the key components and the type of data flowing
between them. The Property Manager uses a system spec-
ification to produce a pool of potential properties. The State
Iterator examines the system states (sequentially or in parallel)
and feeds the consistent, global system state to the Property
Checker. The property checker checks the properties against
each state, updates their statistics and invokes the Property
Filter at coarse timescales. Using the property statistics, the
filter attempts to reduce the size of the property pool in an
effort to speed up overall execution time. At the end of the
state iteration, the Property Reporter module selects a handful
of the almost-invariants in the property pool and reports them
to the developer for further inspection.
Avenger is primarily a testing tool. To pinpoint a pro-
gramming error or discard a reported property altogether, the
programmer relies on available domain knowledge and source
code inspection. She can also feed the almost-invariant to a
debugging tool that produces a sequence of steps that lead to
an invariant violation, e.g., [16], [22]. Avenger is best-suited
for finding almost-invariants via violations of safety properties
(those that should hold at all times). It is not capable of dealing
with liveness properties, i.e., those that hold eventually.
A. Using Avenger
1) Developer’s input to property generation: Avenger gen-
erates properties referring to the variables that represent the
state of system nodes. Some development frameworks make
the state of a node explicit [13], which in turn makes it possible
for Avenger to automatically extract the relevant variables.
In the general case of arbitrary C++ code, Avenger uses a
developer-provided system specification to become aware of
the relevant pieces of state.
A system specification consists of two parts: Variables and
Predicates. We use examples from our application of Avenger
to XORP [11], a popular open-source routing platform, to il-
lustrate Avenger usage. Providing this input is straightforward:
one of our researchers unfamiliar with XORP required less
than a day to produce the required specification.
Variables The state-related input to Avenger is a file called
Variables.h that contains the specification of the structure of a
system node state. Avenger provides a simple syntax to express
the state structure: the user simply needs to write the identifiers
of the state variables and their corresponding data types. An
identifier is basically a variable name. Global functions or
public class methods with empty parameter lists can also be
used as identifiers provided that calling these functions will not
change the state. In these cases the identifier is the function
name followed by the symbol (). A reference to a basic data
type is expressed with the //VARIABLE keyword, while a
container data type is referenced with the //CONTAINER
keyword. A XORP example is shown below:
//CONTAINER IPv4 { uint32_t addr() };
//CONTAINER OriginTable<IPv4> { Trie<IPv4,
IPv4RouteEntry*> route_container() };
Avenger supports all data types in C++ ranging from built-
in data types such as integers, floats, and booleans, to
complex user-defined classes and structs. Polymorphic types
and templates are also supported.
Further, the syntax allows a few annotations that appears
in between the /* and */ symbols, e.g., /*iterator*/,
informs Avenger whether a certain data type is iterable.
Automatically, Avenger supports standard container data types
such as STL array, vector, set, map, etc. Extending Avenger to
new iterable data types is straightforward and just requires an
implementation of the Iterator interface provided by Avenger
and a simple annotation in Variables.h.
Predicates Similar to other invariant inference tools [7],
Avenger provides predicates that correspond to standard op-
erators (equality, membership, etc.). In addition, Avenger is
extensible by allowing the user to specify additional predicates
of interest. The user does this by populating the Predicates.h
file with predicate templates and providing the corresponding
logic in Predicates.cc.
In general, a predicate combines the variables using opera-
tors, e.g., parent ∈ children. A predicate template expresses
an operation over particular data types. Later during the
evaluation of properties, Avenger calls the implementation of
the predicate template in the Predicates.cc file. For example,
the predicate template we added in XORP to access a non-
standard data structure (details are in Section III) is as follows:
bool predicateCanReach(
const OriginTable<IPv4> &rt,
const IPNet<IPv4> &net)
{
const IPv4RouteEntry* re =
rt.lookup_route(net);
return (re != NULL && re->vif() != NULL);
}
2) Trace Collection and State Iteration: Avenger assumes
that an external module generates a trace of globally consistent
system states. These states can be obtained by periodically
recording the global state of a live execution, similarly as
in WiDS [16]. Alternatively, a module could iterate over the
traces of distributed system events, create the global state after
each step [10] (e.g., handler execution on a node), and feed
it to the state iterator. The traces of the system events can be
obtained from the log files recorded during live deployments.
The consistent snapshots are fed to Avenger as sets of
objects that describe node state (recall that the Variables.h
file describes the relevant state). This means that Avenger
can be applied to systems written in a variety of program-
ming languages, provided that these systems collect consistent
snapshots and convert them to C++ objects to present them
to Avenger. Calling existing functions on the state variables
might require linking Avenger with parts of the application
code that defines the data structures.
B. Avenger Design and Implementation
1) Property Manager: Avenger’s Property Manager uses
a developer-provided specification of the system to generate
the set of potential properties. The main challenge here is
to support the generation of all the relevant properties that
can hold in the distributed system under scrutiny. Next, we
describe our approach to meeting this challenge.
Properties are expressed internally using a grammar similar
to first-order logic. The grammar is sufficiently expressive to
derive complex system properties which, for example, iterate
over container data types while tying together states from
different nodes, as later shown in Section III. Fundamentally,
each property is a disjunction of predicates or their negation.
As in first-order logic, a predicate represents a relation be-
tween variables and can be evaluated as true or false. For
example, n1.hashId ∈ n0.neighbor list, is a predicate which
is evaluated to true if the node n1’s hash ID is a member of the
node n0’s neighbor list. A predicate consists of an operator,
e.g., the membership operator (∈), and variables, such as the
hash ID and the list of neighbors in the above example. To help
Avenger discover properties with universal quantification, the
user expresses iterators that show Avenger how to identify all
the members of the quantification universe. At the top level, a
property iterates over the set of nodes in the distributed system,
potentially with multiple nested iterations. Further down in the
nested loops, a property may iterate over arbitrary container-
type variables, such as arrays, vectors, lists, sets, and maps.
Formally, the following describes the property syntax:
Pri : ∀n0 ∈ nodes . . .∀nm ∈ nodes :
∀s0 ∈ nq.v0 . . . ∀sk ∈ nq′ .vk :
l0 ∨ l1 · · · ∨ lt
which selects m + 1 nodes, ni (0 ≤ i ≤ m), and k + 1
variables, vi (0 ≤ i ≤ k), as the universes of quantifications,
and calculates the disjunction of t+ 1 literals, li (0 ≤ i ≤ t).
Each literal represents a predicate P or its negation ¬P . The
complete set of properties that can be generated is prohibitively
large. For example, n binary literals can be combined to form
22
n distinct properties (formulae)2.
In an effort to reduce computational cost, we do not consider
conjunction of predicates3. This decision has limited impact on
the Avenger’s ability to identify important almost-invariants,
as every first-order logic formula F can be converted to
a conjunction of some other first-order logic formulas Fcf ,
where Fcf does not include any conjunction. While evaluating
the properties over a trace, Avenger tracks their holding rate,
i.e., the cumulative rate of evaluating to true. In the end,
Avenger selects the top almost-invariants to report to the user
(more details are in Section II-E). Because the rank on the
report list of each conjunction-free formula, Fcf , would be
higher than the whole formula, Fw, formula Fw will not be
selected in the process anyway.
a) Property Generation: The following presents a high-
level description of how Avenger generates the initial proper-
ties. First, Avenger parses the list of variables and recursively
expands the container data types to produce a tree of variables
and iterators, each of which is annotated with its type and sub
type. Cyclic dependencies can cause the recursive expansion
to continue indefinitely. Although our state descriptions had
no cyclic dependencies, in future we can limit the tree depth
to avoid this potential problem. The role of this tree structure
is explained later. Avenger then reads in the predicate tem-
plates and generates a first set of predicates by instantiating
predicate templates with all the possible combinations of
variables with the appropriate data types. These generated
literals make use of a single system node reference, that
is, any combination of variables is scoped within the state
of a single node (e.g., contains(n.neighbor_list,
n.hashId)). During a second iteration, Avenger increases
the number of system node references and instantiates a
second set of literals with all the possible and appro-
priate combinations of variables whose scope is now en-
larged to address the state of two system node states
(e.g., contains(n0.neighbor_list, n1.hashId),
contains(n1.neighbor_list, n0.hashId)). This
procedure is repeated until the number of node references
reaches the maximum allowed, set by the MAX_NF control
parameter. And so, one set of predicates is created for each
number of node references. Note that the number of generated
2Observe that n boolean literals can have 2n unique configurations and a
property can be specified uniquely by the set of configurations for which it
is true. We can have 22n subsets of 2n configurations.
3If the programmer so desires, she can include a conjunction in a custom
predicate implementation.
predicates increases polynomially w.r.t. MAX_NF with degree
equal to the arity of the predicates. For example, for binary
predicates, the number of predicates increases quadratically
with MAX_NF.
Finally, Avenger iterates over each set of predicates and gen-
erates the properties by combining through disjunction all the
possible combinations of predicates (and their negation) taken
one at a time, then two at a time and so on. The maximum
number of predicates in a single property is controlled by a
parameter MAX_NT. The number of properties with n literals
is of the order O(nMAX NT ). Rather than leaving the user to
guess a suitable value of MAX_NT, Avenger provides her the
option of specifying the maximum number of properties that
she wants to generate in each class.
Lastly, Avenger uses the tree of variables and iterators to
produce a valid C++ qualifier for each state variable which is
plugged into the properties’ internal representation format in
order to produce a series of C++ statements each of which
implements the evaluation of a predicate.
C. Property Checker
The main task of the Property Checker is to update property
statistics that enable filtering and reporting later on. This
component is invoked for each global state snapshot. Upon
each invocation, the Property Checker evaluates every property
(which yields a boolean value) and assigns an individual
property score. Finally, it adds the score to the cumulative
holding rate which is kept for each property in the pool. A
simple property accounting strategy is to score a property
with one if the property holds at all nodes in the snapshot,
and zero otherwise. The holding rate statistic is later used by
the property filter module, as well as during the final ranking
of the properties, with a general goal of ranking higher the
properties that end up violated in fewer instances.
Spatial Accounting One major difference between checking
the properties in distributed systems vs. single-machine is that
some properties might hold at a subset of nodes but not for
all of them. Using the example property ∀n ∈ nodes : P1, the
predicate P1 can evaluate to true for only some of the nodes
in the global snapshot. We handle cases like this using spatial
accounting which computes a fractional score: we set the score
to the number of times that the property holds divided by the
total number of samples (the number of combinations of nodes
on which the property is evaluated in a snapshot).
Fast Accounting As the property detection process is likely
to start with a large number of possible properties, checking
the validity of all properties has to be done quickly and
efficiently. To efficiently evaluate the properties we observe
that many properties share the iteration over the same iterable
container variables because far more properties are generated
than iterable types exist. The idea is to iterate over all the
iterable containers only once and re-evaluate those predi-
cates/properties that depend on a particular iterator only when
such iterator changes. However, this needs to be done correctly
while handling iterator dependencies and nestings.
Scalability The complexity of checking a single snapshot
in the trace is Ω((n)MAX NF ), where n is the number of
nodes. This is because there are MAX NF universal quan-
tifications over nodes and hence a nested loop with nesting
depth of MAX NF is required. Our most common setup
has MAX NF = 2. The complexity further depends upon
the size of the iterable sets in a node’s state. Let us assume
that there are k iterable sets in a node’s state where size of ith
set is O(Si(n)). Then, time complexity of evaluation can be
stated as O(n∗
∏k
i=1 Si(n))
MAX NF
, as each of these iterable
set will have its own nested loop running over its elements.
Note that the total number of properties does not depend on
the number of nodes and in each iteration, only a subset of
literals which depend on the modified iterators are evaluated.
For simplicity we consider the amount of work done in each
iteration as constant in this analysis. Moreover, each snapshot
is evaluated independently of others. So, the time complexity
increases linearly with the number of snapshots if we assume
that the sizes of iterable sets remain the same.
Load Balancing Given the ubiquity of cheap clusters of
multi-core machines, an important challenge lies in harnessing
the available computational power to speed up checking and,
ultimately, the entire property inference process. We have
parallelized the property checking task by assigning to each
CPU core in the cluster the responsibility of a disjoint subset
of snapshots. For this purpose, we use the operation modulo N
over S, where N is the number of checking processes and S is
the explored state index, so that process x checks the snapshots
for which S mod N = x. We find this simple load-balancing
technique to work well in practice. In our evaluation, 10 quad-
core machines were sufficient to bring Avenger execution time
to less than a few hours for even the longest state traces we
encountered (860,000 states) [21].
D. Property Filter
Recall that the properties in our interest are the ones which
have a holding rate very close to 100%. The properties which
have held much less are unlikely to be chosen at the end of the
property inference process. When the property filter is invoked,
we remove the properties that hold less than a threshold.
Overall, there is a trade-off between the tool accuracy and the
speed of execution which can be controlled by the threshold
filtering value, FILTER HOLD RATIO (default value is 0.95).
At the extreme, one could complete the run of the tool while
keeping all the properties.
E. Property Reporter
The set of reported properties should ideally reveal all the
manifested bugs in the traces of the system run. This set
should not be too large, as inspecting too many properties
can overwhelm the developer. Accordingly, the falsely reported
properties waste developer’s time due to the required efforts
to reject them. Thus, one of our design goals is to report only
a small number of properties. The property reporter module
accomplishes this task, and its REPORT SIZE parameter can
be used to change the number of reported properties (in our
experiments, we set this parameter to 10).
Prioritizing properties Given our observation that the bug-
manifesting input sequences are usually very rare, we look
for properties that hold in most of, but not all, cases. Thus,
we sort the potential almost-invariants by their holding rate in
descending order. The property reporter then iterates over the
candidate list of almost-invariants and applies the following.
Eliminating equivalent properties An important step for
improving the quality of the reported almost-invariants is to
reduce the number of equivalent properties by reporting only
one property from each equivalence set. The properties with
the same holding ratio (to a high precision) are likely to
be equivalent. We use this simple statistic apart from math-
ematical equivalence because there could be two properties
that are not mathematically equivalent, but are in practice
checking the same system aspect. We therefore put the almost-
invariants with the same holding rate in the same equivalence
set and output only one almost-invariant chosen at random.
The original equivalence set can still be reported.
Simplifying properties Finally, we simplify the properties
to help reduce the human effort in analyzing the almost-
invariants. Recall that each property Pr is a disjunction of
some predicates and thus can be split into two or more
properties Pr1∨Pr2∨ . . .∨Prn where each simpler property
Pri contains a disjoint subset of the predicates in Pr. Because
of what we refer to as the Or Effect, we need to make sure
that Pr does not subsume any simpler property that is in
the candidate list. To address this problem, we use a simple
independence statistical test.
III. EVALUATION
In this section, we report our results of using Avenger to
analyze the BGP implementation in XORP version 1.64. BGP
is the standard inter-domain routing protocol in the Internet.
Implementation Details The changes we made to the XORP
source code were minimal, took about two weeks to perform
(we had no previous experience with the XORP platform), and
consisted of: 1) incorporating an existing snapshot algorithm
and 2) writing C++ serialization and deserialization routines
for the Routing Information Base (RIB). The variables we
included in the description file simply reflect the state of the
XORP RIB process: the routing tables and their route entries,
each made of a network prefix, a metric, a next hop, a pointer
to an egress interface, and policy flags. We defined equality
predicates for simple data types (e.g., IP addresses, route
prefixes) and applied basic knowledge of routing domain to
define the reachability predicate that checks the membership
of a route prefix in a routing table (essentially access to a
non-standard data structure, Section II-A1).
Experimental Setup Our testbed makes use of virtual inter-
faces to enable multiple XORP instances to communicate over
a synthetic topology that is installed within a single 48-core
machine. This relatively simple setup does not delay or drop
packets, but it allows us to bring interfaces down and up to
simulate link and node failures as to expose BGP behavior.
In our experiments, we configure multiple BGP instances in
4Due to lack of space, results of applying Avenger to the RandTree overlay
tree, the Chord distributed hash table, and the Paxos consensus protocol (all
within the Mace [13] distributed system framework) are described in the
accompanying technical report [21].
clique (full-mesh) and b-clique topologies [17] with 4, 8, 16
and 32 nodes. Inspired by the BGP problems reported in [1],
we mixed 16-bit and 32-bit AS numbers in the attempt to
uncover unexpected BGP behaviors in our testbed. Finally,
we drove the experiments with a script that can advertise and
withdraw arbitrary prefixes, and trigger link and node failures.
We conservatively marked snapshots as steady state if there
were no UPDATE BGP messages in the past minimum route
advertisement period (30 s by default). In total, there were
11,885 snapshots that were fed to our tool. Starting from
the small set of RIB variables and added predicates, Avenger
generated 3,700 properties and identified two relevant almost-
invariants (only one shown in discussed in this section for lack
of space), out of a total of four reported (10 requested).
Property BGP1: Universal reachability. This almost-
invariant covers complete reachability which is one of the most
important features of the Internet. This invariant is close in
spirit to path visibility, an important BGP property defined
in [9], which specifies that every router that has a usable
path to a destination learns at least one valid route to that
destination. The property Avenger generated is as follows
(after very little cleanup):
∀n1 : ∀n2 : ∀r ∈ n2.ebgpTable : r ∈ n1.ebgpTable
Surprisingly, in our experiments we found the property
being violated a few times during steady state. After careful
investigation, we found that the property was systematically
violated when two or more 32-bit AS BGP speakers were in
the topology and at least one of these speakers was advertising
one or more owned prefixes.
This almost-invariant is evidence that Avenger has all the
required expressiveness to produce two iterations over the
nodes and one iteration over a custom container type with
small amount of developer input (to access a non-standard data
structure). In addition, this almost-invariant ties together state
from multiple nodes in a distributed system implementation.
Discussion Given the difficulty of building reliable distributed
systems, a tool that helps to identify hard-to-find programming
errors is useful. Avenger was effective for every system we
examined. Moreover, two out of four reported invariants turned
out to be relevant in the case of XORP, with one leading to
a previously unknown problem. We note that the seemingly
high false positive rate is typical in anomaly-finding tools [3].
Determining the relevance of the reported properties took
less than a day and primarily involved checking the source
code and, when necessary, the logs and consistent snapshots.
One case required a change in the experimental setup. The
elimination of properties was quick, as the “useless” properties
turned out to be: 1) semantic equivalents of other properties
(e.g., referencing an internal subfield of a routing entry that
is as unique as the entry value itself), or 2) a result of the
expected system operation (e.g., the entries in the routing
tables of two nodes have different next hops). Although the in-
spection process was fairly straightforward, domain knowledge
was still required during source code and property inspection.
Avenger now effectively shifts the burden on the generation
of system traces. These traces should document the opera-
tion of the distributed system under a variety of expected
workloads. Perhaps more importantly, the distributed system
should be subjected to complex failure scenarios (faultloads).
However, achieving the desired variety, especially in the case
of failures, might require substantial resources and execution
time. We note that the recent availability of model checking
tools for distributed system implementations [14] offers the
possibility of quickly obtaining a large number of long exe-
cutions that explore many possible interleaving of the node
actions and failures in so-called random walks.
IV. RELATED WORK
Using invariants during development and deployment
Some distributed systems and algorithms have been designed
from ground up with the invariants in mind. The best example
is perhaps Paxos [15], a distributed algorithm for achieving
consensus over asynchronous networks.
Killian et al. [14] have manually specified safety and
liveness properties in their MaceMC model checker for dis-
tributed system implementations, and used them successfully
to identify bugs in several systems. WiDS [16] similarly looks
for violations of known invariants.
Avenger goes in the opposite direction in the sense that
by checking the traces of the system execution, it detects the
inconsistencies and proposes the invariants corresponding to
the observed inconsistencies.
Invariant inference for single-machine code Static anal-
ysis [4], which involves source code examination without
execution, can be used to infer properties. This approach is
typically sound, but, due to some issues (e.g., pointers), static
analysis is in practice too conservative.
Dynamic approaches overcome the shortcomings of static
analysis by i) generating a large number of possible properties,
and ii) relying on test cases to exercise the code behavior.
Daikon [7], [8] filters out any automatically generated property
that is violated during a test run, which assumes that the
code or specification that is used to generate the properties
is correct. This assumption does not always hold.
Self-consistency Our work is somewhat related in spirit to
checking the self-consistency of source code [6]. This work
uses manually-defined templates and performs static analysis
of single-machine source code to detect common patterns in
sequences of commands. It then reports the deviations from
these patterns as inconsistencies to the developer. However,
it cannot deal with the bugs that are not a deviation from
the similar programming patterns in the rest of the code.
DIDUCE [12] is somewhat similar in spirit to Avenger and
the work in [6], but it works on single-machine Java code and
has significant execution overhead.
Invariant inference for distributed algorithms The work
on automatic detection of properties in SPIN [19] can verify
whether two variables are related by basic operators. The work
that is perhaps closest to ours is [20], whose goal is to infer
the safety properties of distributed algorithms using Daikon.
This work simulates the execution of multiple IO automata
that contain a specification of a distributed algorithm in an
abstract form. In contrast, our work produces properties which
correspond to inconsistencies in distributed system implemen-
tations, and deals with properties in the spatial domain.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we tackle the problem of automatically
inferring distributed system properties. Our tool, Avenger: i)
generates a large number of potential properties, ii) checks
them within the time and spatial domains using traces of sys-
tem behavior, and iii) chooses only several almost-invariants
that warrant inspection by the programmer. Avenger increases
the resilience of distributed systems as inspection of these
properties can uncover programming errors.
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